




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SALT VERIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET VIEWS AND THEIR MEANING FOR THE FUTURE*

by Stuart A. Cohen

In the United States, published discussions of the technical and legal niceties of various SALT-related verification issues are voluminous; many of these analyses are authoritative, having been produced either through official government channels, or by people who have a "need to know" the specifics of U.S. monitoring capabilities, or by former members of the government's arms control community.¹ In contrast, detailed Soviet discussions of verification issues are virtually nonexistent.

Until recently, the only notable verification-relevant public commentary offered by the USSR has been its outright rejection of any suggestion that it might have willfully violated any aspect of the SALT I accords. As an example, General of the Army V. Tolubko, a deputy minister of defense and chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), in response to U.S. allegations of Soviet duplicity in violating the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms, argued that

in all its history the Soviet Union has never violated obligations which it has assumed. Moreover, it will not violate its obligation in such a most important political issue as the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. We are

* A slightly different version of this article will appear as a chapter in William C. Potter's *Verification and SALT*, which is scheduled to be published by Westview Press in late 1980.

This article has been reviewed by the CIA's Publications Review Board in order to assist the author in avoiding the disclosure of classified information; however, neither that review nor the author's affiliation with the CIA constitutes or implies either CIA authentication of facts or endorsement of views.

¹ See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control*, Publication no. 85, March 1976; Les Aspin, "The Verification of the SALT II Agreement," *Scientific American*, February 1979; Jake Garn, "The SALT II Verification Myth," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1979; and Amron H. Katz, *Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State* (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1979) respectively.

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